The campaign trail

According to Iran's Constitution, private ownership of radio and television stations are prohibited. The government controls the vast networks of radio and television stations around the country. Therefore, one expects the National Iranian Radio and Television (NIRTV) to be neutral and give equal time to all the candidates. But, as usual, the NIRTV, led by the conservative Ezatollah Zarghami, has been anything but neutral. Mr. Zarghami has an interesting background worth mentioning here.

In September 1979, when the Office for Consolidation of Unity (OFCU), an organization of Muslim university students that acted as an umbrella group for Muslim societies at all universities, was formed, only three conservative students were members of its central committee. The three were Messrs Ahmadinejad and Zarghami, and Fereydoon Vardinejad. The rest were Islamic leftist students, most of whom are now members of the IIPF (Messrs Ahmadinejad and Zarghami were opposed to the take over of the United States embassy in November 1979). Mr. Vardinejad later joined the reformists, was the director of IRNA (Iran's official news agency) in the Khatami administration, and later Iran's ambassador to Malaysia.

But, both Mr. Zarghami and Mr. Ahmadinejad joined the Revolutionary Guards and fought in the Iran-Iraq war. Then, Mr. Zarghami was appointed the principal deputy to Dr. Ali Larijani (the Majles' present Speaker), a position he served for 10 years, when Dr. Larijani was the director of NIRTV. After Dr. Larijani left his post to become Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Mr. Zarghami was appointed by the Supreme Leader as the director of NIRTV.

Given that NIRTV covers practically all of Iran, its role in any election is crucial. The national nightly news at 8:30 pm, which is broadcast on Channel 1, has a particularly wide following. Instead of using this platform to help people become familiar with the candidates and their plans for the country and their positions on various issues, the news program has been all but completely ignoring Messrs Rezaee, Karroubi and Mousavi. Instead, under the guise of reporting the national news, the nightly news program has become another propaganda tool for Mr. Ahmadinejad.

This provoked strong protests by the three ignored candidates, including demonstrations by Mousavi's supporters in front of NIRTV headquaters, and two strongly-worded letters. One was by Mr. Karroubi to Mr. Zarghami in which he warned Mr. Zarghami not to turn the national TV into "another Kayhan, but with sound and images," a reference to the hard-line newspaper that has been supporting Mr. Ahmadinejad unabashedly, and making all types of accusations against other candidates and their supporters. The second letter was sent to the Judiciary by Mr. Mousavi, in which he accused NIRTV of trying to orchestrate a one-sided and meaningless election.

Finally, Mr. Zaghami relented. The NIRTV announced 6 one-on-one American style presidential debates between the candidates, to begin on June 3.

Accusations fly

Another important development has been the announcement by Dr. Abdolkarim Soroush, one of the most influential Islamic scholars and philosophers in the world, that he would support Mr. Karroubi. This was not totally unexpected, as Dr. Soroush had also supported Mr. Karroubi for the 2004 election, even though he has a long standing friendship with Dr. Mostafa Moein, the main reformist candidate in 2004.

In a campaign rally for Mr. Mousavi, Mr. Mahmoud Dowlatabadi, a well-known and highly respected literary figure, declared his support for Mr. Mousavi. However, he also attacked Dr. Soroush very strongly and accused him of playing a leading role in the so-called Cultural Revolution of the early 1980s that closed all the universities for a few years, as well as in the Cultural Revolution Headquarters that had been formed on the order of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Iranian intellectuals and thinkers believe that those events led to the imposition of censorship in Iran that continues today. Even though many thought that what Mr. Dowlatabadi had done was inappropriate, Mr. Mousavi kept silent.

Mr. Mousavi's silence angered Dr. Soroush. In a strongly-worded rebuttal on his site, Dr. Soroush harshly criticized Mr. Mousavi for his silence. He said that for more than two decades, Mr. Mousavi has been a member of the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution, which supervises the cultural and educational planning of the country, and is believed by many to be illegal and unconstitutional (since Iran's Constitution does not mention such a council).

The exchange began a fierce debate between the two camps. As of the date of writing this article, May 20, it was still raging. Dr. Hamid Reza Jalaeipour -- a well-known reformist, a former student of Dr. Soroush, a member of the Central Committee of the IIPF and a leading supporter of Mr. Mousavi -- criticized Dr. Soroush for taking this position and throwing his support behind Mr. Karroubi.

In return, Mr. Abdollah Momeni -- a leading political activist, a former member of the central committee of the Office for Consolidation of Unity and former Secretary General of the Organization of University Graduates of Islamic Iran (see also below) and a supporter of Mr. Karroubi -- wondered out loud why Dr. Jalaeipour was silent during the past four years of repression under the Admadinejad administration, but now publicly criticizes his former mentor. These exchanges, attacks and accusations have generated much bitterness in the two camps.

The author's own opinion is that Mr. Mousavi should have distanced himself from Mr. Dowlatabadi's criticism. He also believes that Mr. Mousavi's supporters have blown the tough tone of Dr. Soroush's rebuttal way out of proportion. The fact is, Mr. Mousavi needs to come open with the people and clarify his role, or lack thereof, in the many bloody events that took place in Iran during his premiership. He also needs to state the reasons for his two-decade silence, a painful period when the nation was experiencing many political upheavals, repression and censorship.

All against One, One against All

It is widely believed that Ayatollah Khamenei supports Mr. Ahmadinejad. He has praised Mr. Ahmadinejad on many occasions, going out of his way to defend the performance of his government, and harshly criticizing his critics. In a recent speech in Kurdistan province he spoke of the characteristics that he thinks the next president should have, including "standing up to the arrogant powers," which were essentially coded words of support for Mr. Ahmadinejad. Although during his annual speech in the beginning of the Iranian New Year, March 21, Ayatollah Khemenei declared himself neutral, by saying that he has only one vote to cast and the rest is up to the nation. The public however believes this posture of neutrality if feigned.

Given that Mr. Ahmadinejad is being criticized by almost all sides, even from within the conservative camp, Ayatollah Khamenei's apparent support for him has put him up against almost everybody else: all against one (Mr. Ahmadinejad), and one (Ayatollah Khamenei) against all (the critics of Mr. Ahmadnejad).

Many believe that the fact that the day before the 1997 election, Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, one of the most influential conservative clerics, publicly stated that he believes that Ayatollah Khamenei supports the establishment candidate, Mr. Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri, resulted in a larger number of votes for Mr. Khatami. Such a perception is so widespread that some of Mr. Karroubi's supporters have been spreading rumors that Ayatollah Khamenei actually prefers Mr. Mousavi (even though they were on bad terms in the 1980s; see Part III), and that, in fact, he encouraged him to run in the election so that Mr. Khatami would stand down. Mr. Karroubi's supporters hope that this perception will take away votes from Mr. Mousavi.

The Candidates' social base

Now that Iran's presidential election has entered the final stretch, it is useful to briefly describe the base of support for each of the four candidates.

Mr. Rezaee does not have an independent base of support among the population. He has always been in the conservative camp. If he attracts any significant vote, it would be from within the conservative camp and, therefore, would only hurt Mr. Ahmadinejad, not the two reformist candidates.

As described in Part III, all the known established reformist and democratic groups in Iran, except for the National Trust Party of Mr. Karroubi, support Mr. Mousavi. Even the Nationalist-Religious Coalition (see Part II) appears to view Mr. Mousavi's candidacy positively. In addition, Mr. Khatami has fully supported Mr. Mousavi, and has been campaigning for him. Thus, the popular base of support for Mr. Mousavi consists, presumably, of the middle class (including its lower and upper layers), the educated and the professionals. Many believe that Mr. Mousavi may also have a significant (but unexpressed) support among the more moderate conservatives. In an attempt to attract such voters, Mr. Mousavi has sometimes referred to himself as a "principlist reformist."

All the reformists who are unhappy with the slow rate of progress and the more moderate reformist groups, such as the IIPF and the Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organization (see Part II), support Mr.

Karroubi. Interestingly, they are the same people whom Mr. Karroubi used to call the "radicals," and was strongly opposed to when he was the Speaker of the 6th Majles. Mr. Karroubi does have support in some provinces, such as Lorestan, and among more conservative and traditional layers of society who are unhappy with the conservatives.

Mr. Ahmadinejad's main support base is the poor and uneducated in small towns and villages. In addition, he can count on the votes of some layers of the Basij militia who blindly follow the orders that are given to them, either by their religious leaders, or by their military commanders. But, altogether, they make up at most 15% of eligible voters. Practically speaking, Mr. Ahmadinejad has no base of support in larger cities and towns.

Thus, the key to the outcome of the election is the degree to which people turn out to vote. As the election approaches, the percentage of people who likely to vote appears to be increasing significantly. If the turnout is large, on a par with the 80% participation in the 1997 elections, Mr. Ahmadinejad will be in deep trouble.

A large turnout has another benefit: It would reduce the possibility of fraud.

Declarations of Support for the Candidates

As the election fever spreads, most of the political groups, as well as notable artistic, literary, academic, and civic figures have begun declaring their support for one of the candidates. Part III already listed many of such groups and people. There have been several important developments since the publication of Part III. Thus, in what follows, we describe the new developments.

Mir Hossein Mousavi

Two groups that are known as the "right and left hands" of Mr. Rafsanjani (see Part II) have officially declared their support for Mr. Mousavi. Executives of Reconstruction is Mr. Rafsanjani's "left hand," and the Development and Justice Party, his "right hand." More notably, Mr. Rasanjani's daughters, Fatemeh and Faezeh, have been deeply involved in Mr. Mousavi's campaign.

Two important national figures, who are popular among university students, declared their support for Mr. Mousavi. One was Dr. Mohsen Kadivar, a distinguished Islamic reformist scholar who was jailed for his outspoken opposition to the conservatives; and the second, Dr. Ali Reza Alavi Tabar, a leftist reformist. Many actors and movie directors also announced their support for Mr. Mousavi, including Messrs Mohsen Makhmalbaf and Dariush Mehrjouei, two distinguished and acclaimed directors, Mr. Kamal Tabrizi, another movie director, and Ezatollah Entezami, the well-respected actor.

Most interestingly, the Association of Militant Clergy of Tabriz, supposedly closely linked with the same organization in Tehran as the conservative camp (see Part II), declared its support for Mr. Mousavi.

Mahdi Karroubi

The Organization of University Graduates of Islamic Iran (OUGII), known in Iran as Advaar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat and an organization that consists of many previous political activists in the Office for Consolidation of Unity (see Part II and the above), threw its support behind Mr. Karroubi. This is considered as an important development, because OUGII is considered a popular and more radical reformist group frequently criticized by more moderate reformist groups. The Secretary General of the OUGII, and also its leading spokesman, is Dr. Ahmad Zeidabadi, a journalist and member of the Nationalist-Religious Coalition who was jailed for his outspoken opposition to repression and censorship by the right wing. In addition, Freedom Front, an active reformist party, also declared its support of Mr. Karroubi.

Three notable figures, in addition to those listed in Part III, are also supporting Mr. Karroubi. They are Messrs Eisa Saharkhiz and Mohammad Ghouchani, two distinguished journalists. Mr. Ghouchani's father-in-law, Mr. Emad Baghi, a leading human-rights advocate who has been jailed twice and was just awarded the prestigious Martin Ennals Award for 2009, given to a human-rights advocate every year.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

What is significant in the case of Mr. Ahmadinejad has been a lack of, or rather lackluster support, among important conservative groups for a possible second term. The Association of Militant Clergy (AMC) of Tehran Province, the most important conservative clerical group (see Part II), has refused to support Mr. Ahmadinejad. A vote among members of its central committee indicated that Mr. Mousavi has as many supporters among the committee as does Mr. Ahmadinejad. It was widely reported that when supporters of Mr. Ahmadinejad pressured the Association to declare its support for him, Mr. Rafsanjani, a most important figure in the AMC, threatened to resign if that were to happen.

In addition, the Association of Teachers of Qom's Seminaries (ATQS), known in Iran as Jaame'e Modarresin-e Qom, which is led by Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, the hard-line former Judiciary chief who is reputed to be involved in financial corruption, issued a terse, one-line statement and expressed its lackluster support for Mr. Ahmadinejad. It was widely reported that the ATQS could not agree on supporting Mr. Ahmadinejad, and that some members of its central committee issued the statement in the name of the rest.

Given all the developments, it appears that two factors are the key to the outcome of the election: turnout, and the extent to which the reformists may be able to prevent voting fraud.

Mr. Ahmadinejad's Interior Minister, Mr. Sadegh Mahsouli, known as the "billionaire Minister" is a close ally of the President and does not exactly have a reputation for truth and veracity. There is not much confidence in his ability to be an honest and impartial manager of the election and vote counting. The antidote remains a high turnout.

Copyright (c) 2009 Tehran Bureau

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