HEFFNER: I'm Alexander Heffner, your host on The Open Mind.

I'm delighted to welcome our guest today, Kelsey Davenport.

She's director of non-proliferation policy at Arms Control Association.

Welcome, Kelsey.

DAVENPORT: Thanks so much for having me.

HEFFNER: Kelsey, I wanted to ask you about the situation in Iran with respect to nuclear proliferation.

There was an armistice, a negotiation, a treaty that was established during the Obama administration.

We have now had the Trump administration four years, nearly four years of the Biden administration.

What has changed since the end of the Obama administration in terms of our capacity to know what is occurring in Iran, and if in fact there has been further nuclear buildup?

DAVENPORT: Really there's been a complete reversal of nuclear risk in Iran since the Obama administration ended when President Obama reached the nuclear deal with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

It rolled back Iran's nuclear program and subjected it to the most intrusive monitoring arrangement ever negotiated.

But in response to President Trump's withdrawal from that arrangement, you know, despite the fact that Iran was complying with the accord, Iran then began building up its nuclear program.

And in the past several years, Iran has invested in a number of new capabilities that would allow it to develop nuclear weapons more quickly if the political decision were made to do so.

And in addition to these technical advances, Iran's nuclear policy doctrine also appears to be shifting.

In the past several months, Iranian officials have begun to admit that the country may make the decision to develop nuclear weapons if necessary from a security perspective or in response to any type of Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear infrastructure.

So Iran really right now is what we would refer to as a threshold state.

It's developed the capabilities necessary to move quickly to a nuclear weapon, uh, but it does not yet possess a nuclear deterrent.

HEFFNER: There is a major political party, one of the two major political parties in the United States that insists that Iran was not in compliance, you said matter-of-factly emphatically Iran was in compliance.

How do we know that?

DAVENPORT: Well, the nuclear deal put in place very intrusive monitoring and verification mechanisms.

I mean, the International Atomic Energy Agency was able to monitor every aspect of Iran's nuclear program, and some of that monitoring took place in real time.

So both the IAEA's assessments of Iran demonstrated compliance.

But it's not just that the US intelligence community also repeatedly stated even during the Trump administration prior to the US withdrawal that Iran was abiding by the Accord.

So the breadth of the US Intelligence establishment and the IAEA, I think very clearly established that record of compliance prior to President Trump's withdrawal from the accord.

HEFFNER: Was it one agency or international body that was doing the inspection or multiple entities?

DAVENPORT: The International Atomic Energy Agency has a mandate to conduct inspections under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to which Iran is a party.

So even prior to the negotiations of the nuclear agreement, the IAEA had inspectors looking at Iran's nuclear program, and it actually was these inspectors that raised some of the concerns about Iran's program and its work prior to 2003 when Iran had an organized nuclear weapons program in violation of its treaty commitments.

Now the nuclear deal from 2015 significantly expanded the IAEAs authority.

So it was just the International Atomic Energy Agency inspecting Iran's program.

But they had significantly more verification tools and significantly expanded access due to the nuclear agreement.

HEFFNER: In your mind, that entity has credibility?

It has, if not total credibility, the majority of the world sees that as an objective arbiter in the event that a deal were to be restored, that would still be the most legitimate body to undertake such oversight?

DAVENPORT: Well, the IAEA has the history, it has the inspectors, it has the technology, and it largely has the trust of the international community, where occasionally you might see questioning of the IAEAs' mandate, that actually is more likely to come from Iran and some of the non-aligned movements, which sometimes view the IAEA as kind of a tool of the West as sort of a tool of US non-proliferation interests.

But given the experience, the general credibility and the depth of expertise, the IAEA remains the best positioned body to conduct these inspections, and also they are legally required.

Iran as a member of the non-nuclear, non-proliferation treaty must negotiate and implement a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

HEFFNER: Were there to be deals hatched with other adversary powers, China, Russia, North Korea, is it your thought that the IAEA would still be the entity through which that oversight would take place?

Or do you think it's just unrealistic because of the suspicion with which those types of powers view the entity?

DAVENPORT: I think it would significantly depend on the type of an agreement negotiated.

Any type of non-proliferation deal, so that would likely be US negotiations with Iran, North Korea, other proliferation risks like Saudi Arabia, uh, that would very likely include the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Again, because of its mandate, its expertise, and its general credibility, it's the best suited to do this job.

But any type of arms control agreement that the US might reach with Russia, China, I think it's extremely unlikely that the IAEA would have a role there because the IAEA does not do weapons related verification activities.

So in the event of any type of agreement kind of between the nuclear armed powers, I think it's more likely that some type of independent inspection regime or some type independent agency would be set up in that case.

HEFFNER: My point is that that entity really doesn't exist right now to the extent that the UN is also viewed as a subjective and not credible arbiter by those powers.

You basically said what I think is important for the audience to understand, which is in order for us to imagine those types of deals, there would have to be the creation of a new entity to be able to bring it to fruition, in effect.

DAVENPORT: I think either a new entity or an agreement between those powers on a set of protocols and inspections, and some of that is actually driven from concern about proliferation.

If you are bringing in inspectors from states that do not possess nuclear weapons and you're exposing them to nuclear arsenals to weapons designs, that can increase the risk of proliferation.

So that's one of the reasons why the nuclear arm states, I think, have been hesitant to engage with non-nuclear weapon states when there has been limited inspection work between the US and Russia on some of their previous arms control agreements.

HEFFNER: Let me ask you back to Iran specifically.

You mentioned the fact that the Trump administration completely overturned the American involvement in a deal.

In your mind, why was it impossible for President Biden when he came into office to expeditiously resurrect that?

DANVENPORT: Well, I think it was possible in the early months of the Biden administration.

President Biden campaigned on the commitment to restore US compliance with the nuclear deal, but he didn't act quickly enough.

I think there was a concern in the Biden administration that the United States not appear overeager to return to the negotiating table with Iran.

I think that was an irresponsible misjudgment, and as a result, the United States lost the time to negotiate that agreement when there was a more moderate Iranian president in power.

Several months after Biden was elected, a new Iranian president came in, Ebrahim Raisi, who was much more hard line and wanted to reopen some issues in the negotiation, and that setback talks.

Now, unfortunately, I think Iran's program has advanced past the point where it makes sense from a nonproliferation perspective to restore that 2015 deal.

Iran has invested in too many new capabilities and expanded its program to the extent where that agreement would not be as effective as it would have been had President Biden restored it more immediately upon taking office.

HEFFNER: We know that the program has been expanded as you described, because of our intelligence gathering operations.

Is that how we know that?

DAVENPORT: Well, there's a combination of factors.

I mean even though Iran is no longer complying with the terms of the 2015 nuclear deal, Tehran is still required to allow certain IAEA inspections.

So there is a limited IAEA presence in Iran that reports regularly on the program.

Also US intelligence, you continues to issue assessments on whether or not Iran is undertaking key activities related to weapons development.

Now, currently, the United States, you know, is not assessing that there is an active nuclear weapons program.

But I think the intelligence community has very rightly been raising concerns about the expanded program and Iranian rhetoric, which suggests that Tehran may indeed make the political decision to develop nuclear weapons if security situation and the security environment in the region shifts.

HEFFNER: Has the president's hands turned again?

The president is not the president that you're referring to, that was more radicalized.

There is once again, a potentially moderating force in the political hierarchy of Iran.

DAVENPORT: Yes, the more hard line President Ebrahim Raisi was killed in a helicopter crash several months ago.

And I think to the surprise of the international community and perhaps to the Iranian establishment itself, Iran elected a more moderate president, Pezeshkian, and he campaigned on lifting sanctions and renewing nuclear negotiations with the United States, which is really the pathway to that type of sanctions relief and economic development that he's seeking.

Now he just took office and is still in the process of establishing his cabinet and his advisors.

But certainly I think the United States should try to test this opportunity with the new Iranian president, to at least in invest in some initial actions that would deescalate tensions, nuclear tensions with Iran and reduce the risk of nuclear miscalculation.

I think Biden could still try to pursue something before he leaves office that could stabilize this current nuclear crisis and then set up the next president to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement that really reduces nuclear risk over the long term.

HEFFNER: When you say nuclear crisis, by that, do you mean the idea that Iran possesses nuclear weapons?

DAVENPORT: Well, I think I use nuclear crisis, I think to describe several scenarios that pose a real risk that the United States is confronting right now.

First, yes, there is the risk that Iran could make the decision to develop nuclear weapons.

There also is the risk right now because of the reduction in monitoring that Iran could be diverting nuclear materials or centrifuges which are used to enrich uranium for a covert program to pursue weapons down the road.

But there's also a real risk of miscalculation when you have a country on the threshold of nuclear weapons, a country whose officials are threatening perhaps to pursue nuclear weapons, if the US misjudges an Iranian action and prematurely resorts to military force, that could escalate to a broader conflict, and that could drive Iranian thinking to believe nuclear weapons are necessary to prevent future attacks on its territory.

So I think the risk of miscalculation is real, and I think the risk of Iran, you know, developing or trying to preserve the capacity to illicitly develop nuclear weapons is real as well.

So I think we're actually facing several nuclear crises kind of embroiled in this moment, in part because we're not seeing enough proactive attention on trying to diplomatically diffuse the nuclear escalation we're seeing right now.

HEFFNER: Combine that with the broader geopolitical tensions in the region and what has been identified as a proxy war and Iran's involvement in conjunction with Hezbollah and Hamas against Israel and some Western allies.

Do you think that the most effective way to tackle the nuclear question is in tandem with the broader political and military escalation in the region or separately?

DAVENPORT: I certainly think that the United States needs to be focused on both reducing nuclear risk and also stabilizing the regional environment.

Right now what Iran is doing is it's using its threshold status to try to deter future Israeli aggression against Iran and to try to deter any US military involvement sort of against Iran.

So it is tying its nuclear ambitions and the possibility of developing weapons to the broader regional security situation.

So if Iran feels that the security situation necessitates its retention of that threshold status or necessitates a development of nuclear weapons, it's not going to negotiate a significant rollback in its nuclear program.

So I think it's important to do both, but I wouldn't necessarily tie them together in one negotiation, simply because the regional aspect is going to involve other actors, and these may need to move at different timeframes.

HEFFNER: Talk to me about the tactics of President Biden, at the conclusion of his term now considering a new deal or reviving aspects of the old deal in a new deal and the process for convening that type of negotiation, and how that differs from the approach that a new administration, namely a Harris administration or a second Trump administration would take.

DAVENPORT: Well, nuclear negotiations are complex, they're time consuming, and when they involve the Iranians, usually there's a significant rehashing of grievances.

So I think Biden has to be very modest in his expectations for what can be accomplished in the coming months.

What I would do if I was advising the Biden administration would be to try to pursue some reciprocal de-escalation steps.

I would try to incentivize Iran to enhance IAEA monitoring, so there would be more assurance that Tehran is not dashing to a nuclear weapon or diverting materials for a covert program, and in exchange, put some limited sanctions relief on the table that could be allowing a limited amount of oil sales that could be unfreezing some of Iran's assets held abroad.

But that type of small scale reciprocal action I think could significantly reduce tensions and again, reduce the risk of miscalculation and the risk of Iranian proliferation that would then set up a President Harris or a President Trump, I think, to pursue a longer term deal.

Now, I do think a longer term negotiation with Iran is going to need to differ strategically than the 2015 deal that that Obama negotiated.

I think Iran's experience with the 2015 deal raised concerns about the sustainability of any accord and the United States' ability to actually deliver on sanctions relief.

So I think a Harris or Trump administration would be wise to try to better involve the regional states in providing incentives to Iran to roll back its nuclear program, which Iran appears willing to do.

Already we're seeing some activity between Iran and the Gulf states that could be kind of built upon as an incentive for Iran to roll back its nuclear program.

But again I also think strategically the US has to look at the broader US Iranian relationship and broader security conditions in the region, if it actually wants Iran to take those steps to roll back its nuclear program.

So we need a more holistic strategic approach to the US-Iran relationship of which the nuclear should be a significant part.

HEFFNER: What is your assessment of how the US can better manage a de-escalation, an end of the Israel-Hamas war?

Because it seems to me that we're not going to establish any significant nuclear renegotiation if that is not adjudicated first, that's a prerequisite.

DAVENPORT: Well, I think Iran has also made very clear that it will refrain from counter attacks against Israel, if there is a resolution of the Gaza issue and a ceasefire.

So I think the administration needs to be putting more pressure on Netanyahu to engage in good faith.

And the US should really be considering if it's weapons transverse to Israel actually conform with us conventional arms transfer policies.

I think both of those aspects could help create some pressure that could bring about a cessation of hostilities in Gaza.

HEFFNER: When you say policies, do you mean norms or policies when it comes to US weapons transfers?

DAVENPORT: Well, the US has a conventional arms transfer policy.

I think it is not applying it as vigorously as it should be in the Israeli case.

HEFFNER: How do you compare that to the Ukrainian case?

DAVENPORT: Well, I think there are aspects of the Ukrainian case where the US could take some lessons in its application to the Israeli case.

I think some of the transfers to Ukraine and tracking of those weapons have been much more transparent than in the Israeli case.

I think the US has been far more, forward leaning with the Ukrainians in discussing situations where US weapons should and should not be used.

So I think there are some applicable lessons from Ukraine that could be applied to Israel there.

HEFFNER: In all of the years now, decades we've been talking about sanctions in the Russia case or in the Iranian case, I have not seen the evidence that demonstrates their efficacy.

Am I missing something?

Can you educate me?

DAVENPORT: Well, I think assessing whether or not sanctions are efficacious does depend somewhat on the goal of the sanctions.

There have been certain sanctions levied against, say, the North Korean nuclear and missile program that have slowed the development of those programs and have prevented North Korea from acquiring some of the technologies that could make its missile force more lethal.

Has it stopped the program?

No, but slowing it certainly is beneficial from a non-proliferation perspective.

The other thing I think you have to take into account is are the sanctions paired with a credible off ramp?

Right?

If you want to create leverage using sanctions, you have to demonstrate that the pain inflicted by those sanctions can actually be rolled back.

That's an area where I think the United States has really struggled, and where I think the experience Iran had under the nuclear deal is going to make it more difficult for the United States to strategically use sanctions in the future to try to influence states' behavior.

Similarly Trump's decision to reimpose sanctions despite Iran's compliance that too plays into the credibility deficit that the United States is going to face going forward if it actually wants to strategically employ sanctions as part of a nonproliferation policy.

HEFFNER: Tell me if this thesis is wildly off, but one of the reasons I've come to this conclusion is to think that in 2024 there are so many back channels in black markets to get goods, and Russia and China, principally China, and other parties that are not fully developed or democratic in alliance with China can produce goods that can give access to the Iranians or North Koreans what they need.

So the thesis that I've been operating with the sanctions are far less meaningful than they were because of these black markets.

True, false?

DAVENPORT: I think black markets certainly contribute to a decline in efficacy of sanctions.

Uh, but I think there are also some broader geopolitical shifts that have that contribute to the decline of sanctions effectiveness.

One that I would name is non-proliferation used to be a unifying goal for the five recognized nuclear powers.

And we saw in the period, the mid 2000s, really through, 2016, the United States, Europe, working very closely with Russia and China on gradually increasing sanctions pressure on Iran, gradually increasing sanctions pressure on North Korea, even when it wasn't in the economic interest of Russia and China to abide by those sanctions.

That however is shifting in part because of Ukraine, in part because Moscow and Beijing I think do view the United States as often overreaching with its sanctions in the past several years.

So that lack of unity, the lack of international support for sanctions is a tool of pressure also contributes to that decline in efficacy.

So that plus the development of these illicit networks, the open disregard and contempt that we're seeing Russia show for sanctions, for instance.

All of that then I think contributes as well to the decline in sanctions efficacy.

HEFFNER: Bottom line, Kelsey, is there's no quick fix.

I just ask as a final question, is there anything that we can do to negate the impact of the black markets or to lessen their existence, beyond what you just said, which is reach a consensus around counter and non-proliferation.

Is there anything that can be done in legislation, national or international acts to control and reduce the presence of those black markets?

DAVENPORT: I absolutely think there are additional steps the United States can take.

One trend that I have noticed is that Congress loves to pass sanctions legislation, but is less interested in actually looking at whether or not sanctions are being effectively implemented and supporting capacity building programs, particularly in states where these black markets might run through to try to close off those loopholes.

So more attention on implementation, more attention on capacity building, more attention on areas like export controls.

All of that can be useful in reducing the influence of these black markets.

Are they going to eliminate it completely?

Probably not these types of markets, these types of networks, they do evolve.

They do respond to any crackdowns on implementation, but certainly it would help slow their development, and that would be very beneficial from a nonproliferation perspective.

HEFFNER: Wonderfully insightful, if not scary.

DAVENPORT: Thanks for having me.

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