The front lines of the war have hardly moved in the last few months, but could the course of the war change in 2024.

We have two perspectives now, from Charles Kupchan, who served in the National Security Council staff during the Obama and Clinton administrations.

He's now a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Georgetown University professor.

And Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a former senior intelligence official who focused on Russia and Eurasia.

She's now at the Center for a New American Security.

That's a bipartisan part as a national security and defense policy think tank.

Thank you both for being here.

The war in Ukraine has been described to me by a defense official as a war of inches at this point, that even with the extensive support that the West has given Ukrainian forces, there have not been any significant breakthroughs.

Andrea, is what we're seeing, is this the definition of a stalemate?

ANDREA KENDALL-TAYLOR, Center For a New American Security: Well, I think that's certainly the narrative that is coalescing.

And it is true, as you say, that the front lines haven't meaningfully changed in many, many months.

But I think that narrative of a stalemate is both wrong and it's unproductive.

It's wrong because both Ukraine and Russia are really in a race to rebuild their offensive capability.

We know that Russia has not changed its objectives in Ukraine.

And if given any breathing room, it will progress in its goal to subjugate Ukraine.

And I think it's unproductive because it's leading to a greater sense of fatigue both here in Washington and in other European capitals in terms of their willingness to sustain the military aid for Ukraine.

So, rather than stalemate, I actually think 2024 is a really critical year that will shape the trajectory of this conflict.

And that's why it's so important that U.S. Congress passes the legislation to sustain the military aid to Ukraine.

GEOFF BENNETT: Charlie, how do you see it?

Is Ukraine positioned to achieve anything more than incremental advances at this point, especially as the harsh winter sets in?

CHARLES KUPCHAN, Former National Security Council Official: Well, the Ukrainians received an enormous amount of training, enormous amount of armor over the course of 2023.

They launched a major offensive primarily in the south, and they ran into miles of Russian defenses, tank traps, minefields, various kinds of fortifications.

And, as a consequence, they did not succeed in taking back a great deal of land.

In fact, over the course of this year, Russia actually has advanced more than Ukraine, not by much, but a little bit in the north, while Ukraine was more or less stalemated in the south.

And so the question then is, what now?

I think we need to come forward with more economic assistance, more military assistance, but I also think we need to pivot Ukraine from an offensive strategy in which it burns through more and more of what we give them to a defensive strategy aimed at defending themselves for the long term and rebuilding the 82 percent of the country that is under Kyiv's control.

GEOFF BENNETT: I want to come back to that.

Andrea, a question about the support, the 60 billion-plus dollars that right now is a point of contention on Capitol Hill.

If Ukraine did get that money, what's the best-case scenario?

Would they then be positioned to win the war?

ANDREA KENDALL-TAYLOR: That aid will basically allow Ukraine to fortify its defensive positions, but while concurrently enabling Ukraine to train its new units and equip those new units so that they would be positioned to wage a new offensive in 2025.

I mean, I think the goal here is to really help Ukraine get through what will be a very difficult year and position them to reapply pressure on Russia in 2025 to try to change the Kremlin's calculus about what it's willing to tolerate and for how long.

Right now, President Putin is riding high.

He believes that he's blunted the Ukrainian offensive.

He sees the fatigue in Western capitals.

And so he has no reason to get to the negotiating table.

So it's really incumbent on the United States to position Ukraine to be able to ride this year out and apply new pressure on the Kremlin, such that it judges that it can't win a long war.

And, in that case, they get into negotiations in a position where Ukraine has the leverage to impose a lasting peace.

GEOFF BENNETT: Picking up on that point, what would those negotiations look like, adding your perspective that Ukraine should focus on consolidating, as opposed to continuing its offensive?

CHARLES KUPCHAN: I think we need to have a plan to make sure that Ukraine has what it needs to defend itself.

And I think that the prospect of a new offensive, of trying to break through Russian lines, of taking back Donbass and Crimea, that doesn't look likely.

And, as a consequence, I think you have to say, let's make sure that Ukraine 2024, 2025, and onward has what it needs to defend itself.

And then, once we get a stalemate that the Russians and the Ukrainians both agree is the case, that's when I think the door opens to diplomacy.

Will the Ukrainians in the near term get back their land?

I doubt it.

But I think their chances of restoring territorial integrity are better at the negotiating table than on the battlefield, especially after Putin leaves power, although that may take quite a while.

GEOFF BENNETT: And, Andrea, what's your read of The New York Times' reporting recently that Putin had signaled through intermediaries that he was willing to negotiate an end to the war?

I mean, what's his cost-benefit analysis at this point?

ANDREA KENDALL-TAYLOR: Yes, I personally don't put a lot of stock in that reporting, in large part just watching his demeanor and his public statements.

He believes that he has the upper hand in this conflict and he's watching a West that appears to be tiring in its support for Ukraine.

And so it's hard to imagine that he would be willing to enter into any negotiations that Ukraine would find acceptable.

I think, at this point, if Putin is even thinking about negotiations, which I don't think he is, but if he is, when he's thinking about negotiations, he's thinking about the subjugation of Ukraine.

And those terms would be entirely unacceptable.

So it's not a productive place to enter into negotiations.

GEOFF BENNETT: And President Biden has said repeatedly that, if Putin is successful in seizing Ukraine, that he won't stop there, that other parts of Europe could be at risk.

Do you share that assessment, that view?

CHARLES KUPCHAN: I think it's unlikely that Putin, however the war in Ukraine goes, is going to attack a NATO country.

He's having a very hard time fighting a war with Ukraine.

I don't think he wants to fight a war with Ukraine, plus 32, assuming Sweden joins, NATO members.

So I think, so far, both sides have avoided an escalation in the war.

But I do think that we also need to ask not just what Ukraine needs, but what can Ukraine get?

And the debate here in the United States is a tough one.

The debate in Europe has also essentially put on hold more assistance to Ukraine.

And I also think we need to, ask what are the blowback effects here?

Does this undermine the political center in Europe?

We have upcoming European Parliament elections this spring.

We have got a big election here in 2024 in this country.

We have to keep an eye on how the war in Ukraine is playing domestically, as well as what -- how the war is going there.

And that's part of the reason that I think a defensive strategy, telling the American people that we're giving Ukraine what it needs to defend itself for the long haul, is the best case to be made.

ANDREA KENDALL-TAYLOR: The one point I would articulate a bit differently than Charlie is, I do think that Russia is likely to remain a durable threat, including to NATO countries.

And you look at Russia's mobilization of its economy, it's put its economy on a wartime footing.

It's increased production of drones, of missiles to levels that are greater than they were before the war started.

The war in Ukraine really has become the primary justification for Putin's regime.

And I worry quite a bit that, particularly if he's successful in Ukraine, that he could turn his sights, including against a NATO country under the right conditions.

And so this isn't something that's going away.

And,really, the United States and NATO need to prepare for a long-term confrontation with Russia.

GEOFF BENNETT: Thank you both for your insights.

Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Charlie Kupchan, appreciate it.